



Accountability, Rule of Law and fairness in Constituency Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) Management in Vwawa Constituency, Tanzania

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Abstract

This paper presents findings from a study which set forth to examine the governance of Constituency development Catalyst Fund. It focused on three pillars of governance which are; accountability, rule of law and fairness. The study was conducted in Vwawa constituency, in Mbozi District, Songwe Region - Tanzania. The study data were collected through semi-structure interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and Observation. They were later transcribed and subsequently thematically analyzed. The findings revealed that CDCF implementation was imbued with lack of accountability although villagers had chances to report all cases with fraudulent elements. Rule and regulations were observed, but in some cases were violated by some officers. CDCF distribution was fair, however, in some circumstances was influenced by some politicians. The study concludes that, absence of CDCF reports in village public notice-board jeopardizes accountability. The observation of rules and regulations is silent to all CDCF stakeholders. Fairness in the allocation of CDCF is encouraging because the needs differ from one village/ward to another. The study recommends that, it is important to have well informed citizens who can be able to hold all stake holders accountable and observe rule of law. The distribution of the funds should not be influenced by the politicians or other public officers.

Key words: Governance, CDCF, Accountability, Rule of law, Fairness.

Introduction

Governance in the recent past has attracted voluminous publications which till now seem not to be agreeing on what exactly it is and as the result there have emerged a number of perspectives on this concept. For example, Rosenau (2000) underscores governance as mode of allocating standards while viewing government as operating mechanisms through which the allocation is accomplished. But for Hooghe and Marks (2009) governance refers to the process of decision-making by different societal stakeholders on issues that affect their lives. However, to others it is perceived as the multidimensional term used to describe the interaction between citizens and their rulers and the way government can help or hinder their constituents' aspiration

(Rothberg, 2002). While for Peter (2011), governance is about solving problems/ challenges faced by the communities collectively. As such, it means the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that

determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are made, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say (Graham *et al.*, 2003).

Notwithstanding the above arguments, good governance is thus determined by the impact of the exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens (Shah, 2005). Besides, World Bank (WB) referred to good governance as those neoliberals' reforms of the public management that the WB believed could lead to great efficiency (Bevir, 2013). Nevertheless, the concept of good governance first appeared in the UN documents as well as in documents of World Bank (WB) in 1992 and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996 (Katsamunskas, 2016)

It has therefore, become a political and economic conditionality that is inseparable from debates about appropriate bilateral and multilateral efforts (Weiss, 2000). Furthermore, good governance can be understood as the exercise of officials' power in the management of countries' resources in the effort of increasing and utilizing such resources for the betterment of life (Mdee and Thorle, 2016). Good Governance is enhanced when services delivered are based on citizens' preferences and ensures greater accountability of the public sector (Shah, 2005). But as for WB, good governance constitutes several principles/pillars, namely, 1. Participation, 2. Accountability, 3. Transparency, 4. Efficiency and Effectiveness, 5. Responsiveness, 7. Rule of law, 8 Fairness (Graham *et al.*, 2003).

In the context of this paper good governance was measured in terms of three pillars which are accountability, rule of law and fairness. The three pillars were selected because they were the most observed and practiced in the study area. Similar studies were assessed by some scholars basing on some of the pillars of good governance (Reich, 2018; Ingram, 2017; Hood, 2010). Accountability as one of the key principles of good governance is needed in the management of public resources. It also involves people's interest, groups', civil societies', the courts, and the press interests (Johnston, 2012). As per Vasconcellos *et al.*, (2018) accountability is a mutable term that adopts itself to each situation in which its mechanism are implemented. But REPOA (2014) posts that accountability means holding elected or appointed officials entrusted with public mandate and organization charged with managing public functions answerable for specific actions or activities to the citizens from whom they derive their authority (Mallya and Kessy, 2013). Sanctions and compensations are the attributes of accountability (Fox, 2007). It involves ethics and politics as well as technical challenges (Reich, 2018). Nevertheless accountability in this paper is conceptualized as the disclosure of revenue and expenditure of the CDCF by village officers, imposition of sanctions and compensations in case of fraud or misuse of the funds. However, Accountability and rule of law are closely connected and that one has the potential to reinforce initiatives that promote the other (Farrall, 2014).

The reliability of the rule of law requires rules to be known in advance, that they are actually enforced and applied consistently and fairly (IFAD, 1999). However, rule of law refers to a principle of good governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including state itself are accountable to laws that are publicly disseminated, equal enforced and independently adjudicated (Nollkaemper *et al.*, 2008). In this paper, therefore, the rule of law refers to rules and regulations concerning the CDCF management including aspects such as CDCF bank account, selecting suppliers/contractors, keeping bank slips and receipts of purchased materials to be used for development projects.

Finally, fairness is also among the pillars of good governance. This pillar ensures that all members of the community feel that they have a chance in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream. This particularly applies to ensure that views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision making (Sheng, 2008). This therefore, requires mechanisms to ensure that all

stakeholder groups have the opportunity to maintain or improve their well-being. In the context of this paper, fairness is referred to as equity in the allocation of the CDCF money in the villages' development projects and as an act which influences the distribution of funds in villages. All the three principles of good governance mentioned above are there in order to manage the fund in accordance with the CDCF Act No. 16 of 2009. But management in this paper is conceptualized as the allocation of CDCF for development projects, retaining CDCF reports and receipts used for providing equipment/materials for CDCF funded projects, providing CDCF reports and opening of Bank accounts for CDCF.

Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) are types of decentralized government funding mechanism that send funds from the central government to each constituency for expenditure on development projects intended to address particular local needs (Malya and Kessy, 2013). Nevertheless, CDF policies have been practiced in different African, Asian and Caribbean Countries. For instance, in Tanzania, CDF was introduced in 2009 under Constituency Development Catalyst fund (CDCF) Act No 16 of 2009 and was named as Constituency Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF). Under its Act, CDCF provide governance mechanism to ensure that, CDCF resources are used as intended to achieve their targeted objectives. CDF therefore, gives legislators a way to deliver essential goods and services to constituents and provide the opportunity of popular participation in development projects (Baskin, 2010).

Notwithstanding, the Commonwealth countries have principle guidelines for the operation of CDF and it highlights transparency in selection and implementation of the projects, demand for accountability and maintain regular oversight. CDFs also should foster public learning through monitoring and evaluation of the projects (CPA, 2016). According to Article 10 (1) of CDCF Act, 2009, at the constituencies' level CDCF is managed by CDC committee which has the maximum number of seven members, who include, member of parliament (MP) who is the Chairperson, District Planning Officer (DPLO) - (Secretary), two ward councilors, two ward executive officers (WEOs) for Tanzania mainland and in case of Zanzibar one Sheha, and one person nominated by the committee from among the active NGOs in the area, if any. Consequently, the general responsibilities of the Constituency Development Catalyst Committee (CDC) in the Article 11 (2 {a-d}) are, to receive and scrutinize project proposals; approve projects proposals; compile quarterly reports, returns and reports of development projects undertaken in the constituency; and execute any other duty as may be necessary. According to Kimani (2009), it was hoped that CDF would enhance people's participation in decision making process, and promote transparency and accountability. This was therefore, meant to promote good governance in the communities.

CDCF governance in Tanzania is about the extent to which members of the CDC committee, officials and constituents adhere to good governance criteria of rule of law, accountability, participation, transparency, equity, efficiency and responsiveness. The CDC committee is the main organ of CDCF that is responsible and answerable for all activities of CDCF in constituencies, and due to this CDC committees necessitate abiding with good governance pillars in its functions. To achieve accountability of the fund, there is a need to have appropriate information to overcome problems in the community. Literature confirms that information dissemination is one of the principle agents to accountability of appointed and elected officials (Reich, 2018; Kosack and Fung, 2014; Fox, 2007; Ball, 2009).

The proper management of CDCF is inseparable from the pillars of governance such as accountability, rule of law and fairness under which CDCF Act, 2009 sets parameters on how to manage the CDCF in all electoral constituencies in Tanzania including Vwawa constituency. The parameters set include the allocation of funds to development projects, retaining the reports and receipts used for purchasing equipment/materials for CDCF projects, providing CDCF reports, and opening CDCF bank account (Article 5 {1-7}, 6 {1}, 9 {1} and

23 {1} of the CDCF Act, 2009). However, there is insufficient information on how CDCF's Act parameters were disseminated in Vwawa constituency to facilitate accountability, rule of law and fairness in CDCF management. It is assumed that combination of these elements of good governance can create conducive atmosphere for conducting government business that is pro-people, and one that is likely to accelerate the development process (Mallya and Kessy, 2013). This paper, therefore, reports the findings of the study that aimed at examining the accountability of CDCF management, rule of law in CDCF Project management and fairness in CDCF management in Vwawa Constituency, Tanzania. These answer the following questions: Who were accountable in disclosing CDCF reports and answerable in case of misuse of CDCF? Which rules and regulations guided the management of CDCF funded projects? and what were the criteria for allocation of CDCF in the villages?

Theoretical Framework

The study was guided by Decentralization Theory as propounded by Alexis Tocquesville in 1820s. The theory considers "transfer of responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower level of government as the best practice and imperative in discharge of public affairs" (Fallet, 2005). Elaborating it further Barnett (1999), argue that decentralization is the transfer of authority, responsibility, and accountability from central to local government. For Kisumbe *et al* (2014), decentralization is a vehicle of reforming governance with the prime intention of transferring some political, financial, and administrative power from central government to local government and can also be driven by the desire to move services closer to the people.

Nevertheless, for the World Bank (2004) decentralization encourages the desire to bring politicians and policy makers closer to clients and to make services more effective, although success depends on how decentralization affects relationships of accountability and enhances fairness. Thus, it is taken as a political strategy, (Kisambe *et al*, (2014). Decentralization is therefore, expected to boost public sector efficiency, as well as transparency, participation and accountability in service delivery and policy making (Mello, 2000). The assumption is that decentralization works by enhancing citizens' voice in a way that leads to improved social services delivery. Above all the mode of citizens' participation can largely be categorized into vote and voice (Kauzya, 2007).

Conversely, in Tanzania, decentralization is part of the efforts made by the government to improve social services delivery at local level (Molel, 2010). Decentralization was adopted with the aim of bringing government closer to the citizens because, in a system in which decisions about resources allocation and services delivery are supposed to be more responsive to local needs, usually people's directly involved in decision making or indirectly influencing those decisions is paramount (Massoi and Norman, 2009). In the context of this paper, therefore, the Decentralization Theory was used to establish how the transferred responsibilities, resources and authority from the central government to constituencies and ultimately to the citizens were managed in line with accountability, rule of law and fairness. In this perspective the lower level of the government includes; CDC committee, WEOs, WDC, VEOs and ordinary citizens.

Conceptual Framework

Accountability and rule of law are closely connected; one enforces initiatives that are promoted by the other. Accountability is subjected to law in the sense that, one can be answerable basing on rules and regulations set in the rule of law. Sanction and compensations in accountability depend on the rules and regulation. Officers who are involved in the allocation of CDCF are also accountable to whatever happens in the process of distributions of the funds and require to observe rules and regulations. All of them work together for the purpose of good management of the CDCF.




Figure 1 Conceptual Framework (Source: Author's own construction, 2019)
Study Methodology

The study was conducted in Vwawa Constituency in Mbozi District, Songwe Region. Vwawa Constituency is one among 265 electoral constituencies in Tanzania and is composed of 18 wards. However, out of 265 constituencies Vwawa constituency has been one of the 26 new electoral constituencies since 2015. The major economic activities in Vwawa constituency are farming and livestock keeping. Simple random sampling was used to obtain Vwawa constituency out of 26 new constituencies. The reason for selecting the new ones is to examine how the CDCF was managed in these newly constituted constituencies.

The study adopted a case study design as the most appropriate to guide the study. A case study design enables the researcher to rely on multiple sources of data for triangulation purposes (Stelja, 2013). The study's targeted population constituted Village Development Committee (VDC) members and ordinary citizens. Data collection was by means of Key informant Interview, focused group discussion (FGD) and observation. Observation focused on observing practical projects and CDCF disbursement provided in form of materials.

Data were collected from purposively selected 17 key informants from District Councils, wards and villages. The key informants included district planning officer (DPLO), ward executive officers (WEOs) and village executive officers (VEOs) who provided information on CDCF implementation in their administrative areas. To allow flexibility without affecting focus, semi-structured interviews were used to key informants. According to Creswell (2012), interviews provide useful information when you cannot directly observe participants and they permit participation to describe detailed personal information. Data were also generated from focus Group Discussions (FGDs) involving groups comprised of 5 to 9 participants. The FGDs were conducted in village councils found in ten villages namely Mbewe, Ndolezi, Sakamwela, Hanseketwa, Senjele, Namlonga, Chimbuya, Isandula, Lumbila and Wellu II. In each selected village, a focused group discussion (FGD) was carried in small groups consisting of men and women. There were also categories of FGD. The

first category composed of ordinary citizens and the other consisted of village development committee members (VDC). The participants were purposively selected during an extra - ordinary villagers meeting called by the VEOs. The FGDs were guided by a well-structured themes and topics for discussion. Furthermore, observation was done on the practical projects implementation in the constituency such as medical doctors' houses, dispensaries and classrooms. It was also done on CDCF provided in form of materials like cement, iron sheet, desks and other materials.

Data were thematically analyzed and conclusions were drawn based on various themes identified. The analyzed themes were obtained from research questions which originated from the study objectives (Table 1). Correspondingly, Creswell (2012) puts it that the use of themes is another way of analyzing data because themes of similar codes are aggregated together to form a major idea in the data base. The data recorded using a tape recorder were first transcribed, after transcription, different categories were created and labeled (open code process). The categories with the same codes were connected in a logical and meaningful way. Then the single core category was identified. Thereafter, the case study sets in form of qualitative interpretations and descriptions were then documented. This approach is collectively termed as content analysis.

Table 1. Themes of the study

Main theme	Sub- theme	Coding
Accountability	Who were accountable and how	- Disclosing CDCF report on public notice board - Answerability in case of fraud and misuse of fund
Rule of law	Rules and regulations guiding CDCF projects implementations	- Rules and regulations in accordance to the CDCF Act. - Keeping of receipts use to purchase equipments /materials. - Selection of suppliers/contractors. - Opening of bank account special for CDCF
Fairness	Criteria used to distribute the funds for development projects Politicians influence of CDCF projects	- Equity in allocation of CDCF money in villages. - The influence of politicians in the distribution of the CDCF

Findings and Discussion

CDCF governance in this section is viewed by basing on some pillars of good governance as per World Bank and IMF perspectives. It is therefore; based on the pillars of accountability, rule of law and fairness. Focusing on accountability, it considers the answerability of elected and appointed officials to display CDCF reports for the constituents to get information. It is further based on the steps taken in case CDCF is confronted with fraud. While the rule of law focus on some rules and regulations observed during CDCF implementation, fairness, specifically focus on fair distribution of CDCF in supporting development projects in villages.

Accountability on CDCF management

In this sub-section, the study focused on village officers who were responsible for disclosing CDCF report on the village public notice-board and answerability in case of fraud or misuse of CDCF. The findings show that in some villages, like Mbewe, Well II, Ruanda and Ndolezi there were notice-board in the government office, while in the rest of six villages namely; Namlonga, Sakamwela, Lumbila, Ihanda, Hanseketwa and Senjele there were no public notice boards at the government office where reports could be posted (Table 2). This was revealed by one of the Key informant of Hanseketwa village whose view was that: *“There is no notice-board at our village government office. The village assembly meetings always provide the report of expenditure of the funds used for the projects.”* (Key Informant 1: April, 2017).

The quotation here indicates that some village officers did not notice the importance of public notice-board that was to be placed at the village government offices; this is why there was no ‘public notice-board’ in some villages. However, even in the villages where there were public notice- boards, still there were village officers who did not display CDCF reports on the public ‘notice-boards’ as the means of demonstrating accountability. This implies that, there were no habits of displaying the report of the expenditure at the ‘public notice board’ in spite of the fact that citizens had the right to see the reports of revenue and expenditure posted on the village public notice-boards. The only way that villagers got the report was through village assembly meeting, and this could be accessed by to those who were participating in the village meetings. Otherwise, there was no access to information about CDCF report and other issues that belong to the villages.

Disclosing information in the public notice-board is one of the means of “disseminating information”, and thus facilitates citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Kabyemela (2017) found that, most of the activities undertaken by the village governments in Tanzania were not disclosed to the citizens. However, Chaligha (2014) points out that, government official can disclose information to citizens through a number of information outlets (public notice-boards, public meetings, newspapers, radio, television, the internet and so on). Nevertheless, Fung and Kosack (2014) argued that, in order for citizens to express their preferences and hold their leaders accountable for realizing those preferences: they require access to the widest possible range of information. Likewise, Gaventa and McGee (2011) and Reich (2018) argued that access to information can contribute to accountability of officials and increase transparency in decision making and can be facilitated by greater accountability to citizens. The literatures mentioned above do not support the findings on the aspect of accountability of the funds particularly on disclosing revenue and expenditure of the fund. Weakness of the village officers and ignorance of most of constituents’ members about regulations with regard to public expenditure was the main case. Reports for CDCF expenditure are supposed to be displayed for the sake of citizens to be informed so as to enhance accountability to officials and all stakeholders.

In case of fraud of the CDCF, village/ward officers gave directives to ordinary citizens on where to report such cases. The next process was the investigation of the allegations to identify the accused ones. This was made clear by one of the FGD at Lumbila village as follows:

...citizens were given instructions where to send the report if they thought there were some elements of fraud on CDCF. In case of fraud the village government council prepares the report to be sent to the public village meeting. Once the report is delivered to the village meeting and discovers the elements of fraud, then investigation is done to identify who are involved in misuse of the funds, whether providers or suppliers or receivers of funds/materials in the village (FGD: May, 2017).

The implication is that, CDCF as a funding mechanism from central government is also subjected to fraud. Citizens were therefore given instructions on how to deal with those who misuse funds and hence promote

accountability among providers and users of funds at the village level. Consequently, decentralization theory emphasizes on the transfer of responsibilities, resources and authority from the central government to the ordinary citizens. In this aspect the theory concurs with the findings, due to the facts that, ordinary citizens were given the authority and responsibility to deal with wrong doers in case there were anyone accused of misusing the funds. This facilitates accountability among all CDCF stakeholders. Likewise, Hood (2007) points out that open meetings attended by key stakeholders, may provide mechanism for asserting procedural and allowing public review and criticism thereby advancing accountability. When citizens are empowered, whether on their own or in alliance with others, their demand for accountability can make politicians or officials respond in ways that compensate for weaknesses elsewhere in the service delivery chain (World Bank, 2004). Officers, citizens and other stakeholders are held answerable to the acts performed during the process of implementation of the CDCF supported projects. Sanctions and compensation are vital in accountability arena; one actor can demand explanations or justifications of another actor for its actions and punish the second actor on the basis of its explanations (Reich, 2018).

Appendix ii, Table 2: Villages with and those without Public notice-board

Sn	Villages without public notice boards	Sn	Villages with public notice boards
1	Namlonga	1	Mbewe
2	Sakamwela	2	Wellu II
3	Lumbila	3	Ruanda
4	Ihanda	4	Ndolezi
5	Hanseketwa	5	NA
6	Senjele	6	NA

Source: Field data

Rule of law on CDCF management

The study findings in this sub-section: on one hand are based on regulations in accordance to CDCF Act, 2009 with regard to CDCF bank account and on the other hand, focus on the rules and regulations concerning receipts of purchasing equipment/materials together with slips for banking transaction and selection of the suppliers/contractors of the CDCF supported projects. In case of CDCF bank account, the findings show that, villages did not open a special bank account for CDCF but instead whenever, CDCF was brought in form of cash; the funds were deposited in village bank account and thereafter used to support development projects. This was viewed in one of the FGDs of Sakamela village as follows; *...the CDCF is deposited in the village bank account, and the supplier/contractor is given a cheque that has been approved by village council* (FGD: April, 2017). While the other FGDs of Well II village was of the view that; *...the lists of the projects selected are sent to the district council. Then the District Planning Officer deposits money in a particular village bank account* (FGD: May, 2017). The opinions of the two FGDs meetings imply that, it was not necessary for the village to have a special bank account for CDCF and that only village development account was enough, any fund for development could be deposited there. In some circumstances CDCF was sent in form of materials like cement, iron sheets and iron bars for constructions. Under such circumstances there was no need of bank account because the money had already been used to purchase materials.

However, when CDCF could be sent in form of cash and deposited in a village account: the study found that, the receipts for purchasing equipment or materials for construction and receipts for banking transactions and payments could be kept ready for auditing. This was evident from the disclosure by one of the Key informant from Chimbuya village whose narration was; *"In our village there are files that keep the receipts and other documents including CDCF receipts and documents."* (Key Informant, April, 2017). This implies that rules and

regulations were observed with regard to the use of CDCF, as keeping receipts is good sign of accountability. With reference to the CDCF Act of 2009 article 17 (1), the council shall compile and maintain a record showing all receipts and disbursements on a monthly basis in respect of every project under this Act.

The findings further revealed that the suppliers or contractors for CDCF projects were selected by either ward officers at ward level, if the projects belonged to the ward and at the village if the projects belonged to the village and sometimes suppliers could as well be selected directly by the CDC committee. However, in some occasions, WEO, VEO and MP influenced the selection of suppliers. These officers directed the purchasing officers where to purchase materials by specifying a definite shop. This was revealed in one of the FGDs meeting held at Lumbila village as follows;

...the village is given the procedures of getting materials by CDCF committee. The letter is brought with the proposed suppliers. Sometimes the letter comes with precaution from either VEO or WEO or MP that, the materials should be purchased in a specific shop; if not their request will be disapproved. (FGD: May, 2017).

This therefore, indicates that, some good government officials did not follow procedures in accordance with the Public Procurement Act of 2004. On one hand, this might have been done to safeguard the community interests since constituents are hardly informed about the fund and on the other hand, this might have been doing this for their self-interests and not community interests as such. In some circumstances, materials could be brought by the CDC committee and supplied to the villages. This means that there was no quotation process on purchasing the materials as per rules and regulations of public procurement Act, 2004. Decentralization Theory highlights among others matter, the transfer of authority from the central government to the constituency and ultimately to the citizens. Contrary to this, the findings show that ordinary citizens in the study area were not given full authority to decide about the suppliers / contractors something that could lead to biasness and encourage nepotism in the selection of the suppliers/contractors.

The URT (2012) emphasizes that, in liberalized markets potentials contractors should be allowed to compete in a transparent and fairly managed environment that allows each eligible contractor an opportunity to participate in public procurement contract offerings. This was different from the findings, and it is contrary to the rule of law, because in most cases the regulations were violated. This kind of practice could jeopardize rule of law and accountability as important pillars of governance. Similarly, it was also contrary to decentralization theory which emphasizes on enhancing citizen voice towards improving social services.

Fairness in CDCF allocation

In this section, the study dealt with equity in the distribution of CDCF money in village communities and how some politicians influenced the distribution within the constituency. With regard to equity on CDCF allocation, the findings show that, some respondents were of the opinion that, CDCF should be distributed to all villages in each financial year because all villages needed the support. This was evident from one of a FGDs meeting at Hanseketwa that as follows;

...each village has its development projects that have to be fulfilled. CDCF should be provided to all villages in each financial year so as to bring equality in all villages and avoid lamentations from some villages and provide development to all. (FGDs: April, 2017).

This therefore, indicates that some constituents were eager to see that the fund was provided to each village in each financial year to facilitate development projects. However, considering the number of villages in the constituencies the provided fund could not be enough to be distributed to all projects in the villages. The best way is to allocate CDCF based on the preferences (Table, 3). However, even if the budgeted amount of

CDCF in the constituency could be in some hundreds million Tsh; not all projects required similar support of CDCF; some projects needed more support than others. The limitation of budget allocated to constituencies could lead to uneven distribution of fund to support development projects in all villages. In fact, this was consistent with Tsubra (2014) whose study revealed that, there was unequal allocation of the funds to the constituencies due to the limited budget of CDCF.

According to CDC Committee of Vwawa Constituency in FY 2016/2017, the constituency received Tsh. 43 million for supporting the projects in all villages of the constituency. If this amount could be distributed equally to all villages without considering preferences, very little amount could be provided and besides could not have been enough even for buying some materials that could fulfill the needs of projects, at a particular moment and therefore, the best way was to distributed funds fairly and in accordance with preferences. The argument based on priorities is good since it can show the essence of contribution of the CDCF in development projects.

Politicians such as MPs and Ward Councilors are usually involved in decision making and the implementation of the CDCF. For some politicians, their involvement in CDCF influenced the allocation of the funds among wards and villages for political gain. This happened sometimes because the MP as a chairperson of CDC Committee influenced decisions of the meetings for personal interest depending on the promises one made during electoral campaigns. This was revealed by one of the officers at the district level, whose narration was;

“The MP as a chairperson of the committee has the power to influence the decisions about the fund. One may have his/her preferred projects to be supported. Yet, the influence of ward councilors is in the ward level when they are with WEOs. They usually give considerations where they can get more support” (Key Informant17: June, 2017).

The implication for this is that, some politicians influenced the decisions because of the promises they make during electoral campaign or political rallies. In some circumstances, CDC committee members had little influence during decision making of CDCF as long as the meeting was headed by the MP as a chairperson of the committee. On the same note Tsubra (2014) posits that some politicians such as MPs can use the CDCF for political gain such as buying voters especially the illiterate ones who may think that the funds come from the MP's pocket. It is always understood that MPs are the ones who solicit projects from the community when mobilizing community projects or addressing political rallies (REPOA, 2014). Some politicians do all these to fulfill what they promised; otherwise they have to be challenged for unfulfilled promises at the end of the term of their leadership especially when they want next term or for their political parties.

Appendix iii, Table 3: Distribution of CDCF in FY between 2015/2016 – 2016/2017

F/YEAR	WARD	VILLAGE	PROJECT	MATERIALS/CASH
2015/216	Ruanda	Wellu II	Medical Doctors House	Cement 18 bags Iron bars 6 pc Tsh.1,074,000/
		Lumbila	NA	NA
	Isandula	Isandula	Laboratory Isandula Secondary school	Cement 20 bags Timber 15 pc Nails 9 kg Sealing board 66 pc
		Chimbuya	NA	NA
	Ihanda	Ihanda	Toilets – Ihanda ward secondary school	Iron sheet 12 pc Cement 20 bags Iron sheet 18 pc Timber 25pc
		Hanseketwa	NA	NA
		Sakamwela	NA	NA
	Nanyala	Namlonga	Medical Doctor's. House	Iron sheet 12 pc Cement 20 bags Timber 25 pc Nails 10 kg Tsh. 637, 500/
		Senjele	NA	NA
	Mlangali	Mbewe	NA	NA
		Ndolezi	Ndolezi dispensary	Cement 20 bags
F / YEAR	WARD	VILLAGE	PROJECT	MATERIAL/ CASH
2016/2017	Ruanda	Wellu II	Well II Medical doctor's house	Cement 40 bags
		Lumbila	Government office Laboratory	Iron sheets 40 pc Cement 20 bags
	Isandula	Isandula	Isandula ward Secondary school	Timber 36 pc Nails 5 kg Tsh. 1,379,000/
		Chimbuya	NA	NA
	Ihanda	Sakamwela	Sakamela primary school	15 desks
		Hanseketwa	Hanseketwa dispensary	48 iron sheets Iron sheet 46 pc Iron bar 4 rollers
	Nanyala	Senjele	Medical Doctor's house	Timber 84 pc Nails 27 kg Tsh.1 700,000/
		Namlonga	NA	NA
	Mlangali	Mlangali	Hostel, Mlangali ward secondary school	Tsh. 10,000,000/
		Mbewe	Mbewe dispensary	48 bags

Source: Vwawa constituency- CDC Committee, 2017

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

The study concludes that, ordinary citizens have the right to access information and to be informed about what is going on in the implementation of the CDCF supported projects and the expenditure of the funds. Absence of CDCF reports in villages' public notice-board jeopardizes accountability among stakeholders. Lack of disclosure of the revenue and expenditure of the CDCF on public notice-board proves that accountability is not fully observed among village officers. The study also concludes that, the observation of rules and regulations is salient to all CDCF officers and the citizens as the beneficiaries. The acts done by officers at the grassroots level of embracing rules and regulations particularly in keeping bank slip and receipts of purchased materials or equipments for development projects is encouraging for implementing CDCF projects. Nevertheless, the influence of some officers such as MPs, WEOs and VEOs in selection of the suppliers or contractors jeopardizes the rule of law in the management of the funds. Consequently, the violation of public procurement procedures in some circumstances by either MPs or some ward/village officers on the selection of suppliers and contractors is to act contrary to the rules and regulations set in Article 15 (1) of the CDCF Act, 2009 and it is contrary to decentralization policy of the country that emphasize on the .the transfer of authority from the central government to the constituency and ultimately to the citizens. It further concludes that, the fairness in allocation of CDCF is encouraging because the needs differ from one village/ward to another. The practice done by some politicians like MPs or ward chancellors in influencing the distribution of funds is jeopardizing fairness as one of the pillars of good governance.

Recommendations

The study recommends that, there is need to have well informed citizens and other stakeholders about the fund, for the sake of holding officers and other stakeholders accountable in case of anything wrong about the usage of the CDCF money. It also recommends that, citizens as the beneficiaries of the funds should not be excluded in decision making in some aspects like selecting suppliers / contractors. Instead they should be given the chance to participate fully. This is emphasized in the decentralization theory. Lastly, it recommends that, the distribution of the fund should not be influenced by the politicians. Any kind of influence from a leader or an individual should be seriously discouraged.

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